This paper charts the evolution of the theory of strategic culture through several generations of scholarship and explores contemporary arguments about the role of culture in shaping national security policy. The paper devotes special attention to policies related to weapons of mass destruction and threat assessment. Key questions include: Do cultural theories provide useful explanations of national security policy? Is strategic culture "semi-permanent," as most of its supporters suggest, or can it evolve over time? And how universal is strategic culture? The essay concludes that while constructivism has generated new attention to ideational foundations of national security policy behavior, there remains substantial room for refinement of the research program.
INTRODUCTION
Cultural approaches to strategic studies have existed in various forms for hundreds of years. The argument that culture influences national security policy is grounded in classic works, including the writings of Thucydides and Sun Tzu. Clausewitz advanced these ideas by recognizing war and war-fighting strategy as "a test of moral and physical forces." The goal of strategy was much more than defeat of the enemy on the battlefield-it was the elimination of the enemy's morale. 1 In the 20 th century, national character studies linked Japanese and German strategic choices in World War II to deeply rooted cultural factors. Russell Parsons, she contended that interest-driven strategies are significant mediating conditions for state behavior.
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But while sociological models of culture became increasingly complex, subsequent studies of political culture yielded little theoretical refinement during this period. Critics argued that the approach was epiphenomenal and subjective, and that proponents of political culture made exaggerated claims about its explanatory power. 12 Cultural interpretive arguments remained alive in area studies, but fell out of favor in political science with the behavioral revolution.
STRATEGIC CULTURE AND COLD WAR NUCLEAR POLICY
In 1977, Jack Snyder brought the political cultural argument into the realm of modern security studies by developing a theory of strategic culture to interpret Soviet nuclear strategy. Snyder suggested that elites articulate a unique strategic culture related to securitymilitary affairs that is a wider manifestation of public opinion, socialized into a distinctive mode of strategic thinking. He contended, "as a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of 'cultural' rather than mere policy." 13 Snyder applied his strategic cultural framework to interpret the development of Soviet and American nuclear doctrines as products of different organizational, historical, and political contexts, along with technological constraints. The result was his prediction that the Soviet military exhibited a preference for the preemptive, offensive use of force and the ori- gins for this could be found rooted in a Russian history of insecurity and authoritarian control.
Snyder's contributions resonated with other security policy analysts, and subsequent work on strategic culture such as Booth's Strategy and Ethnocentrism (1979) continued to explore the ideational foundations of nuclear strategy and superpower relations. Gray (1981) suggested that distinctive national styles, with "deep roots within a particular stream of historical experience," characterize strategy-making in countries like the United States and the Soviet Union. He defined strategic culture as "modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behavior in national terms" and even from "the civic culture and way of life."
Thus, strategic culture "provides the milieu within which strategy is debated" and serves as an independent determinate of strategic policy patterns.
14 In simple terms, this "first generation" of work on strategic culture described a synergistic link between strategic culture and WMD policy. Snyder and Gray argued that culture was a semi-permanent influence on policy shaped by elites and socialized into distinctive modes of thought. Nuclear strategy of potential adversaries could be predicted. Snyder's approach described a Soviet preference for the offensive, preemptive use of force and explained modernization initiatives in the nuclear infrastructure to support this orientation. The result of this study was new attention by scholars to the potentially predictive power of strategic culture.
However, critics asserted that the operationalization of strategic culture was problematic and subjective. They suggested that strategic cultural models were tautological, as it would be nearly impossible to separate independent and dependent variables in a reliable way. Skeptics also charged that strategic cultural interpretations were by definition unique, drawing upon narrow and contextual historiography as much as anthropology. Furthermore, both supporters and detractors believed that the concept of strategic culture was fairly static, focusing on enduring historical orientations with strong predictive capability. Writing in 1988, Gray said that "social science has developed no exact methodology for identifying distinctive national cultures and styles." Literature on the "academically unfashionable subject of national character" was anecdotal at best, yet he believed that learning about the "cultural thoughtways" of a nation was crucial to understanding a country's behavior and its role in world politics. 15 Finally, structural realists had no room for so-called 'thick' descriptive studies and were quick to sweep the concept of strategic culture to the side in their drive for more powerful and parsimonious models. Klein argued that only a "comparative, in-depth study of the formation, influence, and process of change in the strategic cultures of the major powers in the modern era" could make a useful contribution to studies of war and peace. 16 With the abrupt end of the Cold War-and, perhaps ironically, the nonuse of nuclear weapons by the superpowers-the concept of strategic culture once fell into disfavor.
STRATEGIC CULTURE REDISCOVERED: THE RISE OF CONSTRUCTIVISM
In the 1990s, a new generation of scholarly work reasserted the utility of cultural interpretations. 17 Theoretical work on strategic culture, domestic structures, and organiza- Another important dimension of third generation work, the study of security norms, lies at the intersection of culturalist and constructivist research. Norms are defined by Katzenstein, Jepperson, and Wendt as standards "of right or wrong, a prescription or proscription for behavior for a given identity." 37 One of the areas of normative study most closely related to weapons of mass destruction and threat assessment is focused on the nonnuclear norm or taboo. 38 To address the puzzle of why nuclear weapons were never employed by the superpowers during the Cold War, strategist Thomas Schelling first raised the concept of a "nuclear taboo" in the 1960s. He described an emerging tradition of nonuse of ous…something that is not done, not said, or not touched." 40 The nuclear taboo literature places special emphasis on the power of morality and related norms in shaping state behavior. As Tannenwald argues, "nuclear weapons have come to be defined as abhorrent and unacceptable weapons of mass destruction" over the past fifty years. This moral opprobrium has become so acute that the use of nuclear weapons today is "practically unthinkable."
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These optimists claim that taboos represent "bright line" norms that have significant constitutive effects. But this survey of the literature also points to substantial room for refinement of the research program. Areas for further attention include the need for a common definition of strategic culture to build theoretically progressive models, delineation of the ways that strategic culture is created, maintained, and passed on to new generations, the question of the universality of strategic culture, and refinement of models of linkages between external and internal determinants of security policy. While some scholars suggest that adoption of cultural models represents a fundamental rejection of structure, contemporary research suggests more comprehensive models of state behavior can be developed short of falsification of the realist program. 43 Contrary to neorealist critiques of ideational frameworks, few cultural scholars believe that this really is an either-or theoretical debate. Furthermore, many cultural scholars recognize the need for a defined ontology as well as falsifiable, middle-range theory. In this spirit, we offer a "to-do" list for the development of new, progressive models of strategic culture in comparative perspective.
Develop Common Definitions
Given decades of scholarship on cultural determinants, one might assume that strategic culture has become an accepted independent variable in causal modeling. It has not.
Snyder's definition of strategic culture as "a set of semi-permanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns socialized into a distinctive mode of thought" set the tone for decades of investigations. 44 Today, scholars seem to agree that distinct political cultures may exist, but definitions still blur the line between preference formation, values, and state behaviors.
Pye's definition of culture as "the dynamic vessel that holds and revitalizes the collective memories of a people by giving emotional life to traditions" is a case in point. 45 Here, strategic culture becomes a generator of preferences, a vehicle for the perpetuation of values and preferences, and a force of action in revitalization and renewal of these values. Rosen's characterization of strategic culture as the "beliefs and assumptions that frame...decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable" also blurs the line by including reference to the rules that might govern conduct in war. 46 Delineating culture as an independent variable remains challenging, and some scholarly efforts have bordered on tautology wherein domestic political structures are identified as both reflecting and shaping political culture.
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Constructivism has energized work on strategic culture, but it has not advanced the search for a common definition. Elkins and Simeon argued three decades ago that culture is a "shorthand expression for a mind set which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems and solutions which are logically possible." 48 Constructivists often seem to adopt this shorthand approach to descriptions of culture as comprised of both the ideas about strategic choice and the choices themselves. Hudson's contention that culture is "an evolving system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and actions" seems intuitively correct, but offers little in the way of testable hypotheses. 49 In addition, the professed ontological agnosticism of constructivism may not provide a sufficient base for theory-building in strategic cultural studies. Scholars must recognize the difficulty of drawing linkages between political structure and state behavior but yet seek consensus on explanatory boundaries. 50 Johnston offered one of the most promising avenues for a progressive research program on strategic culture by characterizing culture as "an ideational milieu which limits behavior choices." But in so doing, his efforts have drawn fire from both first generation culturalists and constructivists. Johnston frames strategic culture as "shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment." While he noted that strategic subcultures may exist, "there is a generally dominant culture whose holders are interested in preserving the status quo." This approach to strategic culture as a set of shared assumptions and decision rules allows one to separate the strands of culture from dependent variable outcomes like strategic choice. Furthermore, Johnston's conceptual approach to strategic culture was designed to be falsifiable, "or at least distinguishable from non-strategic some of the pitfalls, of past scholarship. According to Kartchner, et al., strategic culture is a set of "shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives." 52 This approach recognizes strategic culture as a product of historical circumstances and national identity, but also allows it a role in shaping decisions about strategy.
This and other work in the latest generation of strategic cultural studies tend to be more focused in its conceptualization of variables for study. Similarly, where civil-military relations are concerned, it is argued the debate is not so much about military doctrines, "but the preconditions for the deployment and the kind of rationality that is at stake in those deployments." 56 Myths and symbols are considered to be part of all cultural groupings. Both can act as a stabilizing or destabilizing factor in the evolution of strategic cultural identities. The notion of myth can have meaning different from the traditional understanding as something unfounded or false. John Calvert writes that it can also refer to "a body of beliefs that express the fundamental, largely unconscious or assumed political values of a society-in short, as a dramatic expression of ideology. 57 Work on symbols has also suggested that these act as "socially recognized objects of more or less common understanding" and which provide a cultural community with stable points of reference for strategic thought and action. formation and communications technology has transformed societies, it has also allowed individuals or groups to communicate in novel ways and cause disruption at a distance.
Explore the Origins of Strategic Culture
Finally, Farrell argues that norms can define "the purpose and possibilities of military change" and in providing guidance concerning the use of force. 61 He has studied how transnational norms of military professionalism have influenced national policies and the process by which this occurs. Farrell considers that transnational norms can be transplanted into a country's cultural context either through a process involving pressure on a target community to accept the new norms (termed "political mobilization"), or by a process of voluntary adoption (termed "social learning"). Norm transplantation, as Farrell refers to it, can thus occur via a process of incremental adoption over time eventually achieving a cultural match between the transnational and national norms.
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Given the range of potential influences on the development of strategic culture, it is imperative for studies to accurately gauge the dynamics at work in any particular society.
Material factors form only one important pillar of the milieu that can influence strategic choices. More nuanced (and well informed) cultural studies will identify predispositions and related ideational factors that may also shape security policy.
Identify the Keepers of Strategic Culture
Identifying strategic culture as a set of shared assumptions and decision rules prompts the question of how they are maintained, and by whom? Most scholars prefer descriptions of political and strategic cultures as the "property of collectivities rather than simply of the individuals that constitute them." 63 It is quite clear that elites are often the purveyors of the common historical narrative. 67 Most scholars agree that elites are instrumental in defining foreign policy goals and the scope and direction of policy restructuring in the face of new challenges. Furthermore, there is a general consensus in the literature that elites are cognitively predisposed to maintain the status quo. However, contemporary works on policy discourse tend to argue that strategic culture is best characterized as a "negotiated reality" among elites. Leaders clearly pay respect to deeply held convictions such as multilateralism and historical responsibility, but the record of past behavior for many countries also shows that leaders chose when and where to stake claims of strategic cultural traditions; they decided when and where to consciously move beyond previous boundaries of acceptability in foreign policy behavior. Ultimately, contemporary scholarship contends, elite behavior may be more consistent with the assertion that leaders are strategic "users of culture" who "redefine the limits of the possible" in key foreign and security policy discourses. 68 Indeed, the constructivist literature suggests 
Identify Scope Conditions for Strategic Culture
The around which to focus attention and resources. 76 However, Lindley-French (2002) charges that Europe lacks both the capabilities and will to establish a common foreign and security policy in the foreseeable future. He characterizes the Europe of today as "not so much an architecture as a decaying arcade of stately structures of varying designs reflective of a bygone era." 77 Given serious disagreements over threat perception, Rynning (2003) concludes that the "EU is unlikely to develop a coherent and strong strategic culture" any time soon. 78 Huntington's 'civilizational thesis' certainly pushes the envelope of theoretical interpretation. 79 He contended that states are part of broader civilizations that share strong bonds of culture, societal values, religion, and ideologies. The most important of these bonds, he argued, is religion, and "the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions." 80 Meta-cultural ties, taken to the broadest level of categorization, are civilizational identities that shape modern world politics and predispose identity groups toward conflict. 81 However, the civilizational thesis has drawn sharp criticism from the scholarly community. Area studies experts are critical of Huntington's willingness to propose the sweeping generalizations that were necessary to undergird the civilizational thesis. Recent investigations of Huntington's claims have concluded that there is no statistically significant causal linkage before, during, or after the Cold War. 82 In the end, Huntington's work may have undermined some of the careful, social scientific progress that had been achieved in the cultural research program.
Can the concept of strategic culture apply to non-state actors operating across territorial boundaries where identities may be formed in the realm of cyberspace? The advent of the cyber revolution has generated several issues concerning our understanding of conflict and security. 83 Emily Goldman writes that security threats related to cyberspace "range from the systematic and persistent, to the decentralized and dispersed, to the accidental and nonmalevolent." 84 Additionally, while acknowledging that the technologies associated with globalization have enabled terrorist groups to conduct operations that "are deadlier, more distributed, and more difficult to combat than those of their predecessors," James Kiras argues that these same technologies "can be harnessed to defeat terrorism by those governments with the will and resources to combat it." 85 According to Victor Cha's globalization security spectrum, "The most far-reaching security effect of globalization is its complication of the Finally, it may also be possible to identify scope conditions under which one is more likely to find constitutive effects of strategic culture. In a classic study, Holsti lays out five "decisional settings" in which belief structures tend to have a great impact on decisionmaking, including: "situations that contain highly ambiguous components and are thus open to a variety of interpretations"; "non-routine situations that require more than the application of standard operating procedures and decision rules"; "responses to events that are unanticipated or contain an element of surprise"; and even "long-range policy planning…that inherently involves considerable uncertainty." 88 These hypotheses suggest that ideational foundations may be more significant in specific contexts.
More recently, Kartchner has hypothesized that a set of conditions may enable strategic culture to play a more dominant role in state behavior. They include: "when there is a strong sense of threat to a group's existence, identity or resources, or when the group believes that it is at a critical disadvantage to other groups; when there is a pre-existing strong cultural basis for group identity; when the leadership frequently resorts to cultural symbols in support of its national group security aspirations and programs; when there is a high degree of homogeneity within the group's strategic culture; and when historical experiences strongly predispose the group to perceive threats." 89 Clearly, efforts to establish scope conditions within which we are more likely to identify strategic cultures that have constitutive effects represents important progress toward middle-range theory.
Develop Models of Strategic Cultural Change
The focus of most studies of strategic culture is on continuity of state behavior. Eckstein suggested that the socialization of values and beliefs occurs over time. Past learning becomes sedimented in the collective consciousness and is relatively resilient to change.
Lessons of the past, therefore, serve as a tight filter for any future learning that might occur. 90 Those scholars who address the potential for change (inspired by Weber, Habermas, and Immanuel Wallerstein), face a great deal of criticism. However, an intriguing characteristic of the latest generation of cultural studies is the recognition of the possibility of change over time. If historical memory, political institutions, and multilateral commitments shape strategic culture, then, recent studies argue, it would seem logical to accept that security policies will evolve over time. 91 This contribution to the strategic culture literature is informed both by studies of foreign policy restructuring and constructivist ideas on foreign policy as discourse. Essentially, this work seeks to challenge "the distinction between behaviour and culture" by considering "culture as practice. However, most scholars rightly assert that any process of change would not be easy. Third, elites play a special role in strategic cultural continuity and change. Perhaps
Berger is correct that strategic culture is best understood as a "negotiated reality" among foreign policy elites. While leaders clearly pay respect to deeply held convictions associated with strategic culture, the story of foreign policy development may be best understood as the pursuit of legitimation for preferred policy courses that may, or may not, conform to traditional cultural boundaries. Indeed, Hymans contends that identity is as much subjective as intersubjective, and that leaders often adopt their own specific conceptions of national identity from among a competitive marketplace of ideas. 100 Both the constructivist and culturalist literature agree on the possibility for norm entrepreneurs to approach events, frame the discourse, and begin constructing a new discursive path toward objectives. Indeed, sociologist Cruz contends that elites have much more latitude than scholars generally allow. They may "recast a particular agenda as most appropriate to a given collective reality or...recast reality itself by establishing a (new) credible balance between the known and the unknown."
In short, Cruz argued, they "redefine the limits of the possible, both descriptively and prescriptively." with priority consideration of homeland security, a new doctrine of preemption that includes a willingness to use military force to achieve security objectives, and a preference for unilat- The theory of strategic culture offers tremendous opportunity for progressive study of strategic choice in the 21 st century, but it clearly contains a few pitfalls as well. I would contend that there is a great deal of potential utility in strategic cultural studies if scholars truly pursue the goal of cumulation outlined here. Progressive models of strategic culture operating from similar sets of assumptions about the sources, influences, and implications of identity have the potential to be highly valuable policy tools. Strategic cultural models speak to concerns in key policy arenas as well, including responses to countries seeking weapons of mass destruction. If one accepts that there are truly different strategic cultural profiles, and that they shape security policy choices around the world, then major powers should tailor their policies to accommodate these cultural differences to the extent possible. Regarding threat assessment, for example, there are significant questions about the applicability of western and traditional models to non-western countries. Studies of Iranian and North Korean decision-making systems, for example, that focus on the dysfunction of the process may ignore significant cultural differences that allow those systems to focus on specific ends and means without traditionally western orientations. A multi-faceted cultural approach allows us to recognize the nuance of competing systems and may further energize our potential for accurate threat assessment.
These arguments are supported in the limited scholarship on identity and strategic choice. For example, George argues "the effectiveness of deterrence and coercive diplomacy is highly context dependent." 104 In a recent article, Jentleson and Whytock recognize that at least three different strategies of coercive diplomacy may be selected to achieve strategic objectives in counterproliferation: "proportionality, reciprocity and coercive credibility." 105 These scholars contend that different strategies of coercive diplomacy may be used effectively to achieve specific objectives, but that the selection of these strategies should be "tailored" to match the national identity conceptions of the target state. Finally, drawing on theories from political psychology, Hymans contends that the decision to develop a nuclear arsenal is "extraordinary," and can be found to be rooted in the national identity conceptions that leaders carry with them. 106 Understanding different national identity conceptions, Hymans contends, can help us to predict whether leaders will ultimately decide to take that significant step.
Recent U.S. efforts to deal with nuclear programs in rival states like North Korea and
Iran are illustrative of the complexity of the challenges. Efforts to dissuade and deter potential enemies from developing nuclear weapons have largely been unsuccessful to date. This is not to say, of course, that U.S. diplomacy has been unsophisticated in identifying the challenges and recognizing nuances in cross-cultural communication. But one could argue that progressive models of strategic culture can only help to inform selection of policies targeted toward specific strategic cultures. Assuming that concepts like coercion, risk, and deterrence are highly culturally specific, the development of more reflexive models becomes essential for both international cooperation and security policy success.
CONCLUSION
While constructivism may represent a paradigmatic challenge to structural realism in the discipline today, most supporters of strategic culture have adopted the more modest goal of 'bringing culture back in' to the study of national security policy. In fact, these research traditions are more similar than some would believe. Scholars must work to overcome barriers to integration of these two approaches into a more comprehensive model of strategic culture formation, implementation, and change. Some argue that one of these barriers is a certain defensiveness on the part of neorealists, who contend that culturalists (and constructiv-ists) simply seek to supplant neorealism. But ultimately, even Desch allows that cultural theories might supplement neorealism by helping to explain time lags between structural change and alterations in state behavior, by accounting for seemingly 'irrational' state behavior, and in helping to explain state actions in "structurally indeterminate situations." 107 The cases of the evolution of German and Japanese security policies are better understood as a product of domestic political adjustments (rooted in culture, traditions, and common historical narratives) to changing international circumstances. Far from an exclusive interpretation, progressive models that explore external-internal linkages and their impact on discrete, strategic choices represent an important avenue for theoretical advancement.
Culture is clearly a factor in contemporary international security, but research still needs to be done on its depth and scope of influence. 
